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ABSTRACT 
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the 
South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused 
severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the 
country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were 
damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of 
communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have 
ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased 
quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also 
allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges 
allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of 
which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical 
segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as 
well as local, concern. 
This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management 
through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial 
earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
New Zealand is located on a tectonic plate boundary between 
the Australian and Pacific plates. The country exists because 
of this complex plate boundary; a subduction zone, along the 
east coast of the North Island, terminates northeast of the 
South Island, where it transitions into mostly strike-slip faults 
in the Marlborough and Alpine Fault regions (Figure 1). 
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake 
occurred in the Marlborough area, resulting in two fatalities 
and 57 injured persons [1]. At least 21 faults ruptured on and 
offshore of the north-east of the South Island of New Zealand 
(Figure 2) [2]. The ruptures began on a fault near Culverden, 
approximately 15 km deep, and continued north-eastwards for 
more than 170 km, at a rupture speed of around 1.8 km/s 
(6,450 km/hr), with Peak Ground Accelerations of around 1.3 
g [1, 3]. Initial estimates suggest between 80,000 and 100,000 
landslides were triggered by the earthquake, within an area of 
10,000 km2, with most of the co-seismic landslides located 
within an area of 3,600 km2 (Figure 2) [1]. Five landslides 
were more than 1,000,000 m3 in size, and 50 large landslide 
dams were identified [1, 4]. 
The earthquake caused widespread damage across the 
northeast of the South Island, including to Kaikōura, a popular 
tourist destination, and Wellington, the country’s capital [5]. 
Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic 
landslides also damaged distributed infrastructure across a 
wide region. In particular, transportation networks were 
severely affected, including a number of state highways in 
central and northern areas of the South Island, including State 
Highway 1 (SH1) in the Kaikōura District, and the Main North 
Line (MNL) railway line between Picton and Christchurch 
(Figure 1). See Stevenson et al. [6] for a summary of the 
economic and social impacts. 
SH1 is New Zealand’s main highway, and runs the length of 
the country, supplemented by a ferry crossing between the 
North and South islands, run by Interislander and Bluebridge 
ferries (Figure 1). Prior to the earthquake, SH1 provided the 
main link between Picton and Christchurch (341,500 residents 
[7]), and beyond to the remainder of the South Island (Figure 
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3). SH1 was by far the shortest road route between Picton and 
Christchurch at around 4 ½ hours, with the closest state 
highway alternative route taking around 6 ½ hours. 
Accordingly, SH1 carried substantial volumes of traffic and 
was a route for transport of goods, as well as being a popular 
tourist drive (Figure 3)
 
Figure 1: Modelled Peak Ground Velocity on land of the 14th November 2016 Mw7.8 Kaikōura earthquake (source: Bradley et al. 
[8]), with key transport networks overlaid, and New Zealand’s tectonic setting (inset). 
 





Figure 3: Major South Island transport usage by Ministry of 
Transport [9] (note: there is no longer a Nelson port to rail 
connection). 
The 350 km-long MNL runs alongside SH1 and is a critical 
network, moving about 1 million tonnes of freight between 
Picton and Christchurch annually [10] (Figure 3). The MNL is 
also a major tourist attraction, with the Coastal Pacific train (a 
KiwiRail Scenic journey service) providing a daily passenger 
service between Picton and Christchurch between the months 
of October and April. 
The disruption of these transport networks caused a number of 
direct localised impacts, such as acute isolation of affected 
communities, including Kaikōura township and a number of 
rural farming communities, through to wider regional impacts 
such as disruption of supply chains [11]. 
This paper presents the impact of the 14th November 2016 
Mw 7.8 earthquake on South Island transport infrastructure, 
and subsequent management through the emergency response 
and early-recovery phases, up until the 21st February 2017, 
100 days after the initial event. Direct impacts on the transport 
network, a timeline of events, level-of-service maps, as well as 
secondary impacts are presented. Lessons learned from the 
event are also highlighted. 
NATURAL HAZARD RESILIENCE PLANNING 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND INITIATIVES FOR 
TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS IN NEW ZEALAND 
New Zealand Infrastructure Resilience 
When considering the impacts of the Kaikōura earthquake on 
transport networks, it is important to consider the 
organisational arrangements and legislative context. New 
Zealand recognises that infrastructure ‘is the foundation on 
which so much of our economy relies’ [12], and so the 
Treasury formed a National Infrastructure Unit (NIU), which 
is advised by the National Infrastructure Advisory Board 
(which also advises the Minister of Finance and infrastructure 
providers). The NIU is responsible for ensuring New 
Zealand’s infrastructure is ‘resilient and coordinated and 
contributes to a strong economy and high living standards’ 
[12]. 
The NIU has progressed from initially planning short-term 
priorities for infrastructure investment and regulatory reform, 
when established in 2009, to producing the Thirty Year New 
Zealand Infrastructure Plan 2015 [12]. Part of this plan aims to 
move New Zealand infrastructure planning away from being 
“asset-driven”, where assets are ‘designed and built without 
fully considering the service being delivered’ [12], to ensuring 
infrastructure providers understand end users’ needs. This 
priority was highlighted again in the Treasury’s Progress one 
year on from the Thirty Year New Zealand Infrastructure Plan 
report, which states ‘simply building things to address our 
problems is no longer sustainable. We need a better 
understanding of the levels of service we want to deliver, more 
mature asset management practices and use of data, and more 
effective decision-making that considers non-asset solutions’ 
[13]. Therefore, New Zealand government policy increasingly 
views infrastructure in terms of the integrated service 
provided; instead of, for example, considering roads, rail lines, 
shipping and air travel separately, increasingly the focus is on 
the ability to transport goods and people around the integrated 
transport network, regardless of the transport mode. 
Section 60 of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
Act 2002 [14] requires lifeline utilities ‘to be able to function 
to the fullest possible extent’, even though this may be at a 
reduced level, during and after an emergency. To this end, 
New Zealand has an increasingly strong “Lifelines” culture. 
Lifeline utilities are entities that provide essential 
infrastructure services to communities and have 
responsibilities for planning and coordinating in a way which 
enables the continuation of these services in an emergency, as 
part of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) 
Groups, the Ministry for Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management (MCDEM), and other relevant government 
agencies and regulatory bodies, legislated under the National 
Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015 [15]. 
A key feature of the Lifelines culture in New Zealand is the 16 
Regional Lifelines Groups across New Zealand, with national 
representation and coordination undertaken by the New 
Zealand Lifelines Council (est. 1999). These regional entities, 
made up of lifeline utility representatives, undertake 
collaborative work with scientists, engineers and emergency 
managers to identify interdependencies and vulnerabilities to 
regional scale emergencies. This collaborative process 
provides a framework to enable integration of asset 
management, risk management and emergency management 
across utilities [16, 17]. 
A notable success story of the value of the Lifelines concept is 
the Christchurch Engineering Lifelines’ Risks and Realities 
project [18], which identified a number of vulnerabilities and 
interdependencies in Christchurch in the late 1990’s and over 
the subsequent decade implemented a suite of disaster risk 
reduction measures. A review of the impact of these mitigation 
measures following the 2010/2011 Christchurch earthquake 
sequence found ‘the damage would have been greater and the 
response slower if the steps recommended in Risks and 
Realities and other preparatory work fostered by the Group 
had not been taken. For example, Orion’s electricity 
distribution seismic strengthening programme, commenced in 
1996 and progressed systematically each year, cost $6 million 
and is estimated to have saved $60 to $65 million in direct 
asset replacement costs and repairs [15, 19]. 
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New Zealand Transport Network 
The New Zealand transport network is owned and operated by 
several different organisations. The New Zealand Transport 
Agency (NZ Transport Agency) is an independent crown 
entity, responsible (amongst other roles) for allocating funds 
from the National Land Transport Funds to land transport 
activities, including local roads, state highways and public 
transport and, together with local and regional government, for 
funding local roads and public transport infrastructure and 
services. NZ Transport Agency is responsible for the state 
highway road network (Figure 1). Local roading is the 
responsibility of territorial authorities in the form of district or 
city councils. KiwiRail is a state-owned enterprise and the 
largest rail transport operator in New Zealand, including rail 
operations in the South Island, and Interislander ferries (Figure 
1). KiwiRail’s ‘core purpose’ is to move people and freight, 
and aims to add value to New Zealand transport by helping 
their customers to be more competitive, assisting with the 
Government’s Business Growth Agenda and offering world-
class tourism experiences [20]. Bluebridge operates the other 
main ferry service between Picton and Wellington (the South 
and North islands) (Figure 1). Numerous other shipping 
companies operate throughout New Zealand waters, and 
numerous private airlines operate throughout the country 
(Figure 1, Figure 3). Air New Zealand is the national airline, 
53% owned by the New Zealand Government. 
NZ Transport Agency and KiwiRail (alongside Transpower, 
the national electricity provider) have developed a shared 
resilience response framework, aligned with the Thirty Year 
New Zealand Infrastructure Plan 2015 [21]. Using a consistent 
approach allows better management of, and cooperation 
between, the networks. Resilience is viewed by the 
collaborators as being concerned with any event, natural or 
man-made (including, for example, climate change), which 
could disrupt the networks. The framework is based around 
three strands: 1) prevention, mitigation and preparedness; 2) 
emergency response; and 3) restoration and rehabilitation. 
NZ Transport Agency has undertaken further resilience work 
specific to its network, through: business continuity planning; 
identifying alternative routes to state highway links; creating a 
system to advise customers of events, impacts and their 
options; and continuing with seismic retrofit, bridge scour and 
rockfall mitigation programmes; avalanche and weather 
monitoring programmes; efforts to proactively reduce ice 
formation on road surfaces; and to build new structures to 
modern standards [21]. However, NZ Transport Agency’s 
most recent “State Highway Network Resilience National 
Programme Business Case” [21] identified a number of areas 
where improvements were needed: 
 ‘while alternative routes are planned for each state 
highway these are not consistently recorded, nor do they 
all have sufficient capacity to be viable alternatives 
without upgrade; 
 ‘there is an inconsistent process used in different regions 
for assessing natural risks making it difficult to 
consistently assess, compare and prioritise service gaps 
and potential responses; 
 ‘there has been no systematic framework for recording 
events, or assessing infrequent risks so current knowledge 
of risk tends to be dominated by the frequently occurring 
events causing a dearth of reliable systematic assessment 
of the scope, location or risk of infrequent events’ [20, p. 
3]. 
NZ Transport Agency’s Capital Works Programme develops 
projects based upon a range of criteria, including a cost-
benefit analysis, which can make it difficult to deliver projects 
with “resilience” as the primary objective or justification, 
though it should be noted “resilience” is often a secondary 
objective in Capital Works Programme projects. This is 
because, for example, even for a relatively frequent natural 
hazard recurrence interval of 50 years, the annual benefit 
needs to be divided by 50. Calculating a Net Present Value 
(calculated for a 40-year period and with a relatively low 6% 
discount rate) from the annualised benefit stream often results 
in a value so small that it rarely becomes a priority, compared 
to other possible improvements such as road safety. 
KiwiRail have developed several systems for consistent 
nationwide review of resilience related issues. Rating 
individual slopes in terms of a “Slope Risk Ranking” allows 
individual slopes to be compared on a consistent basis across 
the national rail network. Over 3,000 slopes have been ranked 
in this manner. Additionally, KiwiRail records all incidents 
across the rail network and regularly reviews these compared 
to asset information such as the Slope Risk Ranking. From this 
investment, choices for mitigation can be undertaken. 
Network-specific resilience improvements have also been 
made for shipping and air transport, as lifeline utilities. 
Unfortunately, there is little publicly-available relevant 
information on specific initiatives for these networks. 
Isolated settlements, as well as wider regions supported by 
supply chains, are increasingly dependent upon distributed 
infrastructure. Due to this dependency, by causing damage to 
distributed infrastructure, natural hazards can now threaten 
beyond their local, direct impacts. The 14th November 2016 
earthquake offers important insights into these increasing 
risks, and, accordingly, the success of specific resilience 
initiatives within the transport sector. 
METHOD 
This paper presents the impact of the 14th November 2016 
Mw 7.8 earthquake on South Island transport infrastructure, 
and subsequent management through the emergency response 
and recovery phases, up until 21st February 2017, 100 days 
after the initial earthquake. Throughout this paper, dates are 
referred to as “Day X”, with 14th November 2016 being Day 1 
and 21st February 2017 Day 100. This paper uses data 
immediately available after the emergency response phase. A 
complete overview of the physical and functional performance 
of all South Island transport is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The earthquake and co-seismic hazards, as well as direct 
impacts on road, rail, bridges, shipping and air transport are 
briefly summarised before presenting a detailed timeline of 
key transport events, derived from discussions with 
representatives from the NZ Transport Agency Christchurch 
branch, Canterbury CDEM, and KiwiRail (co-authors), as well 
as publicly-available information from NZ Transport Agency, 
KiwiRail, CentrePort, SoundsAir, CDEM, Marlborough 
District Council, Kaikōura District Council, Hurunui District 
Council, Waimakariri District Council, and the media. From 
this timeline, maps are produced to show level-of-service 
changes between 14th November 2016 (Day 1) and 21st 
February 2017 (Day 100), for: state highway roads and 
alternative routes; rail lines, Interislander rail-enabled ferry 
services and official KiwiRail diversions; Interislander and 
Bluebridge vehicle and passenger ferries; and commercial 
flights between Kaikōura, Christchurch, Wellington, 
Blenheim, and Picton. Secondary impacts are then presented, 
before discussing the timeline of transport interdependencies 
during the emergency response and initial days of recovery in 






The direct impacts of the earthquake and co-seismic hazards 
on road, rail, bridges, air transport and shipping are 
summarised below. 
Road 
The impact of the earthquake on roading was severe. Prior to 
the earthquake, the travel time between Christchurch and 
Picton was around 4 ½ hours using SH1. Immediately after the 
earthquake, the road travel time increased to more than 8 
hours. SH1, New Zealand’s main highway, was closed 
between Waipara and Wairau River township and SH7 
(including SH7A) was closed between Waipara and Springs 
Junction (Figure 12). Smaller roads (including Route 70) were 
also closed, making Kaikōura, Hanmer, and a number of 
smaller settlements in the area inaccessible by land. Freight, 
vehicle and passenger ferry services between the North and 
South islands were suspended until damage to Wellington port 
could be assessed and berths cleared for use (Figure 12). 
Ground movements caused severe road cracking due to slope 
failure beneath the carriageway (Figure 5a) and vertical and 
horizontal displacement due to fault rupture (Figure 5b), 
making the roading network impassable at a number of 
locations immediately after the event (Stirling et al. [2] 
provides an overview of fault rupture locations and impacts). 
Road damage due to slope instability beneath the carriageway 
was repaired in the first few days following the earthquake in 
all locations apart from those inaccessible due to other damage 
typologies. The earthquakes also increased the risk of co-
seismic hazards. Co-seismic landslides (Figure 5c) and 
rockfalls (Figure 5d) closed the road in a number of places, 
and have presented one of the greatest challenges in repairing 
the road requiring a substantial amount of time and effort to 
clear. A more complete summary of landslides and their 
impacts is presented in Dellow et al. [4]. 
By the end of Day 1, SH1 had reopened from Waipara to 
Cheviot and SH7 between Waipara and Springs Junction 
(including daytime access along SH7A to Hanmer Springs, 
which was no longer isolated) (Figure 13), resulting in the 
travel time between Christchurch and Picton reducing to 
around 6 ½ hours. By Day 2, car ferry services had also 
resumed, albeit reduced services, making road travel between 
the North and South islands viable again (Figure 14). 
CDEM quickly prioritised access to isolated settlements, in 
particular to provide essential supplies including water, food 
and fuel, and to evacuate the hundreds of tourists who were 
trapped in Kaikōura (primarily to reduce the load on local 
supplies). Prior to the earthquake, Kaikōura was accessible 
from the north and south by a coastal rail service and SH1, as 
well as via Route 70 from the south-west (Figure 1). Most of 
the smaller settlements in the area were accessible exclusively 
by road. Following the earthquake, settlements (including 
Kaikōura) were inaccessible by land (Figure 13). 
Despite facilitating efficient evacuation, access via air and sea 
were both unreliable. For air access, poor weather conditions 
could (and did) result in no-fly days, and for sea access, 
damage to Kaikōura port, as well as its small size, meant few 
vessels could dock [22]. The sea bed around the port was 
uplifted and so needed to be re-surveyed for access for 
anything other than small boats [2]. This meant access was 
dependent on the ability to moor offshore, and thus sea 
conditions. Therefore, it became critical to re-establish road 
access. 
NZ Transport Agency began to clear SH1 from the south of 
Kaikōura at 06:00 on Day 2, a decision NZ Transport Agency 
described as “fairly self-evident” because the landslides north 
of Kaikōura were much larger, meaning there was greater 
opportunity to pursue getting the roads open to the south. 
While work began on clearing SH1, a number of options were 
considered by NZ Transport Agency and CDEM, and Route 
70 was decided as the most feasible road to secure quick 
access to Kaikōura. 
Within the first few days, SH1 between Peketa and 
Mangamaunu was opened (Figure 15), and army convoys 
began travelling along Route 70 through to Kaikōura (and so 
also reached Peketa and Mangamaunu). These convoys carried 
essential supplies, at the request of the Emergency Operation 
Centre in Kaikōura and Canterbury CDEM. Before the convoy 
proceeded, a 10-step “go/no-go” assessment (Figure 4) was 
conducted every morning at around 06:00, which involved a 
visual assessment of the road and geohazards (including 
landslide reconnaissance) by helicopter, or by road if the 
weather did not permit flying, weather forecast assessment, 
establishing whether the travel was essential, and creation of a 
recovery plan. Later, specific vehicles needed to repair critical 
infrastructure were also permitted access along Route 70. 
 
Figure 4: Canterbury CDEM “Go/No Go” criteria. 
Road access was a balancing act between three factors: 1. 
repair of the road; 2. (emergency) supplies for Kaikōura; and 
3. access for residents (particularly for farmers to make 
repairs). Prioritisation of any of the factors slowed down the 
other two, meaning effective management and operation was 
critical. 
By Day 4, SH1 was open between Blenheim and Ward, and 
there was controlled access along SH1 between Cheviot and 
Goose Bay, reducing the number of completely isolated 
settlements (Figure 16). 
On Day 11, the first non-emergency vehicles travelled out 
from Kaikōura. 81 vehicles travelled in convoy, subdivided 
into vehicle classes (i.e. cars, trucks), through Route 70 under 
heavy supervision due to the risk the road still presented. 
Those wishing to travel in a convoy registered beforehand, and 
met in specified locations before proceeding, subject to the 
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“Go/No Go” criteria. Daily convoys in and out of Kaikōura 
along Route 70 continued until Route 70 was switched to 
controlled access for residents and emergency services on Day 
23, when SH1 between Ward and Clarence was also opened 
for controlled access, meaning all settlements had road access 
(Figure 21). However, the SH1 diversion remains in place 100 
days after the event, as SH1 remains closed between 
Mangamaunu and Clarence as repair works continue (Figure 
24). 
On Day 38, Route 70 was fully reopened and daytime access 
between Goose Bay and Peketa along SH1 to Kaikōura was 
also permitted, adding some redundancy in accessing 
Kaikōura (Figure 23). This section of SH1 closed three times 
during December and January, twice for a few hours due to 
weather conditions increasing the risk of rockfall onto the 
highway, and then for two days due to a slip. Route 70 
remained open throughout. 
Rail 
The earthquake and co-seismic hazards caused substantial 
damage to the rail network. Immediately following the 
earthquake, all rail and rail ferry services between Palmerston 
North (north of Wellington) and Christchurch were suspended 
by KiwiRail until a rapid survey of the affected region was 
completed (Figure 25). One train was trapped between 
damaged sections of the Main North Line (MNL) north of 
Kaikōura, as it stopped where it was during the earthquake (as 





(a) Pavement cracking on SH1 due to slope instability. 
Photo credit: Dizhur & Giaretton 
(b) Pavement rupture due to fault rupture and subsequent 
access ramp. Photo credit: Dizhur & Giaretton 
 
(c) Landslide on SH1, north of Kaikōura. Photo credit: Tonkin & Taylor 
 
(d) Rockfall on SH1, north of Kaikōura. Photo credit: Dizhur & Giaretton 





(a) Rail line suspended by fault rupture (angle 1).  Photo 
credit: Dizhur & Giaretton 
(b) Rail line suspended by fault rupture (angle 2).  Photo 
credit: Dizhur & Giaretton 
 
 
(c) Large offset of rail track due to landslide  Photo credit: 
Dizhur & Giaretton 
(d) Large offset of rail track due to landslide  Photo credit: 
William Ries, GNS Science 
  
(e) Rail tracks severely distorted and misaligned due to 
fault rupture. Photo credit: William Ries, GNS Science 
(f) Cracking of tunnel wall. Photo credit: KiwiRail. 
Figure 6: Photos of rail damage, following the 14th November 2016 earthquake. 
While passenger rail services in the Wellington area fully 
resumed within 3 days following the earthquake, the majority 
of the MNL remains closed over 100 days later (Figure 30). 
KiwiRail started to assess and inspect the damage immediately 
after the earthquake, following the procedure in their 
“Earthquake Response for Infrastructure” Standard, with track 
gangs and inspectors undertaking visual inspections on 
accessible areas and flyovers over the inaccessible section 
around Kaikōura. Engineering inspections also commenced 
within two days of the earthquake, with multiple teams 
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assessing damage simultaneously along the MNL. In order to 
maintain consistency in recording damage observations made 
by the multiple teams, a KiwiRail-developed “Damage 
Classification Guideline” for rail assets was used. Continued 
aftershocks and the very high risk of further landslides meant 
inspections had to be conducted in a controlled fashion. The 
impact of aftershocks was assessed according to the above 
KiwiRail Standard, which required constant review of Peak 
Ground Acceleration (PGA) readings following aftershocks 
and subsequent inspections (when required). 
Preliminary observations suggest that about 700-750 sites 
along the MNL were affected by this event, with tracks, 
bridges, tunnels, culverts, slopes, embankments and 
communication systems all damaged to varying degrees [23]. 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show examples of damage observed and 
recorded from the visual inspections. Detailed damage 
observations on rail assets are still being collated. 
Rapid assessment and repairs were made to reopen the MNL 
between Picton and Blenheim by Day 3, thus providing rail 
access to carry freight from Picton to the container transfer 
site at Springs Creek, north of Blenheim (to be later delivered 
by truck to Christchurch) (Figure 26). 
The rail service between the North and South islands also 
relies upon a rail-enabled ferry. This did not resume sailing 
until Day 16, when the link span at the CentrePort ferry 
terminal in Wellington, used to load and discharge vehicles, 
was repaired (Figure 27). 
Repair works on the heavily damaged MNL continued 
throughout the Christmas holiday period. This resulted in the 
reopening of a significant section of the MNL between Picton 
and Grassmere by Day 64, which allowed commercial goods 
to be carried between Dominion Saltworks at Lake Grassmere 
and Picton (Figure 29). These repairs also freed train wagons 
trapped near Lake Grassmere, allowing the carriages to be re-
distributed around the rail network. The train stopped partially 
within a tunnel near Kaikōura, has been moved to a different 
location along the MNL to take the heavy locomotives off a 
bridge to prevent damage from future aftershocks, but remains 
trapped. Work trains were able to be run from Christchurch 
north to Bridge 83 on the MNL for load testing of the 
structures on Day 25, but could not travel further due to 
formation and bridge damage. 
Numerous teams continue to work collectively to identify 
badly damaged assets and to explore repair strategies, with 
achievements including: completed concept designs for 
strengthening and/or replacements of major damaged bridges 
and initial construction schedules; continued repairs to twisted 
tracks; detailed geotechnical assessments and testing carried 
out at a number of affected sites to prepare for major 
earthworks; and surveying of damaged tunnels to determine 
repair work required. Three months following the earthquake, 
repair and restoration works on 120 out of over 800 sites have 
been completed, and efforts are continuing to restore the 
remaining sections of MNL back to full service by the end of 
2017. 
 
Figure 7: Track damage states assigned (following the 
“KiwiRail Earthquake Damage Classification Guideline”) 
based on visual inspection of tracks: Minor (e.g. very 
minimal damage to rail and/or sleepers), Moderate (e.g 
subsidence of track >150mm and/or over a distance >50m), 
and Major (e.g. significant vertical and/or horizontal 
movement). 
Bridges 
The vast majority of bridges performed well during the 
earthquake, with most being allowed to re-open after 
inspection in the first few days after the earthquake. Some 
bridges with damage to their piers were cleared for use before 
repairs were completed (Figure 8b, Figure 8c, Figure 8d). 
Although the bridge structures withstood the earthquakes well, 
demonstrating considerable robustness, many bridge 
approaches were damaged due to settlement and horizontal 
movement (Figure 8a), thereby making some bridges 
impassable. Approach reconstruction through the placement of 
fill and resealing quickly made the majority of these road 
bridges usable again. In some locations diversions were put in 
place to bypass damaged road bridges (such as the Oara 
Bridge in Figure 8a that crosses rail lines), and along Route 70 
one bridge was replaced by a temporary Bailey bridge 
alongside the repair to other parts of the Route to allow for 
access. Displacement is a greater problem for rail lines than 
roads, whether vertical or horizontal (Figure 8e). However, 
given the damage to other parts of the rail network, this 
damage is not immediately critical, and repair can be 
scheduled accordingly. 
Palermo et al. [24] provide an in-depth summary of the 







(a) Oaro bridge approach failure and pavement cracking. 
Photo credit: Dizhur & Giaretton 
(b) Lower Mason bridge with damaged supports. Photo 
credit: Dizhur & Giaretton 
  
(c) Lower Mason bridge support damage. Photo credit: 
Dizhur & Giaretton 
(d) Lower Mason bridge support repair. Photo credit: Liam 
Wotherspoon, UoA 
  
(e) Rail bridge 97 MNL approach offset and rail alignment 
failure. Photo credit: Dizhur & Giaretton 
(f) Rail bridge 129 MNL span dislocated from abutment 
due to Kekerengu Fault rupture. Photo credit: Tim Little, 
VUW. 
Figure 8: Photos of bridge damage on SH1 and rail, following the 14th November 2016 earthquake. 
Shipping 
Most ports throughout New Zealand were undamaged by the 
earthquakes, with the major exception of CentrePort in 
Wellington, which suffered substantial damage due to 
liquefaction-induced settlement and lateral spreading, 
rendering the port’s container cranes inoperable [25]. 
Two ferry services, Bluebridge and Interislander, provide the 
main ferry link between the North and South islands between 
Wellington and Picton. Ferry services between Wellington and 
Picton resumed by Day 2 (Figure 14), with the only major 
restriction being for foot passengers, who could not board the 
ferries due to terminal damage. By Day 4, foot passage was 
again possible both ways between Wellington and Picton on 
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Bluebridge services (Figure 16), although full Interislander 
operation did not resume until Day 23 (Figure 21). 
Kaikōura port was also damaged. The sea bed around the port 
was uplifted and needed to be re-surveyed for access for 
anything other than small boats [2]. In part also due to its 
small size, this meant sea access to Kaikōura was dependent 
on the ability to moor offshore, and thus sea conditions. 
Air Transport 
There were no major direct impacts to the air network. 
Wellington and Christchurch international airports, and 
Kaikōura and Blenheim regional airports were undamaged and 
virtually uninterrupted, following brief (less than one hour) 
closures for inspections. 
Secondary Impacts 
Road 
The vulnerability of the state highway network to different and 
cascading hazards presented a substantial risk throughout the 
emergency operation, and continues to do so during the 
recovery phase, especially to working crews who must 
carefully execute tasks in a controlled manner due to the risks. 
Figure 9a shows an example of fault rupture increasing the 
risk of a landslide onto the road, and Figure 9b shows an 
example where a landslide below the road has increased the 
risk of slumping. Canterbury CDEM noted these hazards were 
not apparent when viewed from road level, despite the obvious 
threat they presented when viewed from above as part of an 
aerial geotechnical assessment. 
Perhaps the most substantial secondary impact to the state 
highway network was that the section of SH6 between SH63 
and SH65 became the only section of road connecting 
Canterbury, the West Coast, Southland and Otago to the North 
Island through Picton and Wellington. Presently, there is no 
redundancy for this stretch of road, a problem which has been 
highlighted by the relative ease by which other state highways 
have been closed due to weather and fire events. These include 
SH6, which was partially closed between south of Havelock 
and north of Rai Valley township on Day 2 due to a slip and 
flooding following heavy rain, and more recently SH7, which 
was closed for over eight hours due to rural fire on 1st March 
2017. Similar challenges exist for a road closure due to a 
vehicle crash, which becomes more likely with increased 
traffic flows. 
In an attempt to reduce the risk of motor vehicle crashes on 
SH63, SH6, SH65 and SH7, NZ Transport Agency has 
increased signage, increased public communication with key 
messages, installed temporary traffic signals at one bridge, 
improved delineation, and reduced the speed limit from 100 
km/h to 80 km/h, and down to 60 km/h through Wairau River 
township [26]. Police enforcement has also increased, and NZ 
Transport Agency has also enhanced its response measures. 
The additional traffic, particularly heavy truck freight, is 
causing further travel time delays, as well as accelerated 
pavement damage resulting in large additional maintenance 
costs. To increase road capacity, NZ Transport Agency has 
increased the number of passing bays to increase the number 
of overtaking opportunities, widened the sealed width of 
roads, and, on SH63, constructed three new Bailey bridges 
alongside pre-existing one lane bridges, to allow simultaneous 
two-way traffic flow [27; 28]. Strengthening of large stretches 
of the alternative route’s pavement was also required, 
principally on SH63, as it was not originally designed for the 
traffic loading (diverted from SH1 and as well as diverted rail 
freight) now travelling the route. 
 
(a) Ruptured ground with increased landslide risk to the 
road. Photo credit: Aurecon, 2016 
 
(b) Landslide undercutting road, slumping potential. Photo 
credit: Aurecon, 2016 
Figure 9: Co-seismic impacts. 
Rail 
The earthquake cost KiwiRail $12 million from loss of trade to 
the end of December, and KiwiRail estimates direct costs from 
loss of trade due to the disruption of the MNL will be around 
$25 million by the end of June 2017. Estimates suggest the 
total cost to repair the rail line will be approximately $500 
million (25% of the total estimated $2 billion to restore the 
transport corridor), although 60-80% of this cost is likely to be 
met by KiwiRail insurance [23]. 
The loss of the rail line caused increased use of the road and 
shipping networks (Figure 27); since the MNL is an important 
freight line, KiwiRail’s immediate efforts were focussed on 
minimising the disruption to the New Zealand exporters. This 
included trucking stock along the alternative state highway 
route and arranging rail alternatives for Wellington port freight 
customers to other North Island ports (Figure 27). 
To further reduce disruption to freight customers, and to 
reduce truck congestion on already increased road demands, 
KiwiRail entered the coastal freight shipping market with a 
new “NZ Connect” service on Day 15 (with support of Ports 
of Auckland, Lyttelton Port of Christchurch and ANL 
Shipping) (Figure 27). Auckland and Christchurch ports 
expanded operations and rail services were increased from the 
ports’ inland hubs to maximise the effectiveness of the freight 
route. 
The train trapped near Kaikōura was looted [29]. This led to 
KiwiRail working with the police to better secure the 
remaining train cargo. On Day 38, a crane arrived to remove 
containers off the train, so they could be delivered by road. 
Unrelated to the earthquake, a large rural fire closed the 
Christchurch to Greymouth line on 4th February 2017 (Day 
83) (Figure 30), and this did not reopen until 22nd March, 





North Canterbury Transport Infrastructure Rebuild (NCTIR) 
Alliance 
Following the initial earthquake damage, there was multi-
agency discussion about whether SH1 and the MNL railway 
line should be reopened, especially around the most severely 
damaged section between Mangamaunu and Clarence (Figure 
24) [30; 31]. NZ Transport Agency report that within one to 
two weeks (following the earthquake), the question of whether 
to abandon the coastal road and instead develop an alternate 
route, such as upgrading the Molesworth Track or Rainbow 
Road, was raised. Both are poor quality, summer-only, roads 
that already exist. KiwiRail also report discussing possible 
alternatives, but suggest these were less attractive and realistic 
than the road alternatives. During these discussions, it quickly 
became clear that reopening the existing coastal route was the 
most viable option, for three primary reasons: 
1) Distance: the existing coastal route is by far the shortest 
route. 
2) Cost: The existing coastal route would be able to be 
cleared many times over for the cost of upgrading other 
routes (which themselves are located in a high hazard risk 
area). 
3) Reliability: regular winter closures versus occasional 
storm surge closures. Alternatives including the 
Molesworth Track and Rainbow Road traverse high 
mountain passes, and so would be closed many times 
during each winter just with snow and ice events. NZ 
Transport Agency considers infrequent (even when 
slightly more damaging) closures preferable to frequent 
closures. 
Accordingly, the Government passed emergency legislation to 
ensure repairs to the coastal route could be accelerated, and on 
Day 32, Cabinet (a council of senior Government ministers 
which formulates Government policy) agreed to fund the 
works required, which were estimated at a cost of between 
$1.4 billion and $2 billion [32]. Following this decision, on 
Day 38, the Government announced the North Canterbury 
Transport Infrastructure Rebuild (NCTIR) alliance, between 
NZ Transport Agency, KiwiRail, Fulton Hogan, Downer, 
Higgins and HEB Construction [33]. 
The alliance is responsible for SH1, Route 70, the SH7, SH65, 
SH6 and SH63 alternative route, and the MNL rail corridor. 
NCTIR is led by Duncan Gibb, former lead of the Stronger 
Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT), and was 
formed to reduce delays caused by tendering for work, and to 
pool resources to ensure a more cost-effective repair of the rail 
and road, in the same approach used by SCIRT [33]: this 
ability to pool resources was a key consideration when 
considering whether to repair the coastal route or upgrade an 
alternative. 
NCTIR is operating as the lead delivery agency, managing, 
operating and undertaking all repair, recovery, rebuild and 
resilience works: where appropriate, NCTIR will take the 
opportunity to make some strategic resilience investments, 
such as road shoulder and lane widening, raising the road 
and/or tracks in areas susceptible to storm surges, and building 
rockfall and landslide mitigation structures, as can be found 
elsewhere in New Zealand (Figure 10). The extent to which 
such resilience measures are implemented is expected to be 
decided by mid-2017. 
 
 
Figure 10: Otira rock fall shelter and aqueduct [34]. 
Shipping 
Most ports throughout New Zealand were undamaged by the 
earthquakes, with the major exception of Centreport, 
Wellington, which suffered substantial damage. Many cargo 
ships were diverted from Wellington to other ports including 
Napier, Tauranga and Auckland. This contributed to a 
doubling of freight demand between Auckland and 
Christchurch, New Zealand’s busiest domestic sea route. A 
reduction in rail freight capacity also contributed to this 
increase in demand. 
Ferry services between Wellington and Picton resumed by 
Day 2 (Figure 14), with the only major restriction being for 
foot passengers, who could not board the ferries due to 
terminal damage. By Day 4, foot passage was again possible 
both ways between Wellington and Picton on Bluebridge 
services (Figure 16), although full Interislander operation did 
not resume until Day 23 (Figure 21). 
Shipping was also used as a key emergency resource for 
Kaikōura, being used to evacuate 635 people from Kaikōura 
on HMNZS Canterbury to Lyttleton Port, and provide 
emergency supplies for the township. 
Air 
Immediately following the earthquake, many settlements 
(including Kaikōura) were inaccessible by land. Therefore, 
helicopters were extensively used to access these settlements 
(there was huge demand for helicopter access from civil 
defence, infrastructure providers, media, scientists and other 
groups), as well as plane and sea access for Kaikōura, via its 
small airfield and port. Due to high usage, a five-day 
Temporary Restricted Area was established around Kaikōura 
on Day 4, to facilitate safe aircraft operation during the 
emergency response (Figure 11). 
To evacuate tourists (and vulnerable residents) quickly, a 
“don’t come back empty” policy was implemented by CDEM 
where possible and appropriate. The Emergency Operations 
Centre in Kaikōura prioritised evacuees, and through this 
policy, New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) helicopters 
delivering emergency supplies to Kaikōura evacuated 198 
people by the end of Day 2, and a further 165 by the end of 
Day 3. Air evacuees were received at Woodend by 
Waimakariri District Council and a number of agencies, 
including travel agents, on behalf of Canterbury CDEM. 
Private airlines also added flights, providing capacity when 
other transport modes could not. On Day 2, Air New Zealand 
operated an additional return flight between Wellington and 
Marlborough, as ferries were reduced, and, with no road 
access, SoundsAir operated four flights from Kaikōura to 
Christchurch and Pelorus Air provided a charter service 
between Marlborough and Kaikōura (Figure 14). On Day 3, 
SoundsAir flew four flights from Kaikōura to Wellington 
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(Figure 15). Additionally, on Day 8 (still with no public road 
access to Kaikōura), SoundsAir launched two temporary daily 
services, between Kaikōura and Christchurch and Kaikōura 
and Blenheim (Figure 18). As part of this service, the 
company also offered to carry the town’s postal deliveries on 
the flights [35]. All these Kaikōura flights were new routes, 
and were limited to small aircraft, typically carrying 10 
passengers, due to the length of the runway. Finally, 
SoundsAir added additional flights between Christchurch and 
Blenheim for the Christmas and New Year period, as demand 
increased due to the long inland road diversion (Figure 21) 
[36]. 
 
Figure 11: The five-day temporary restricted area (NZR892) 
established in the Kaikōura area on day 4 [37]. 
Timeline of Key Transport Events 
A detailed table of key transport events during the first 100 
days following the 14th November 2016 is provided in the 
appendix (Table 1). 
The below maps show level-of-service changes between 14th 
November 2016 (Day 1) to 21st February 2017 (Day 100), for: 
state highway roads and alternative routes; rail lines and 
official KiwiRail diversions; Bluebridge and Interislander 
vehicle and people ferries; and commercial flights between 
Kaikōura, Christchurch, Wellington, Blenheim, and Picton. 
Where days are stated without times, the maps show level-of-
service at the end of the day. 
The maps are split into two sets. Figures 12 to 24 show state 
highways and alternative routes, commercial flights and both 
Bluebridge and Interislander vehicle and passenger ferry 
services, which provide the main ferry link between the North 
and South islands between Wellington and Picton. Rail lines 
and official KiwiRail diversions are displayed separately in 
Figures 25 to 30. This is largely because the rail and road 
network follow similar routes, making it difficult to display 
them on the same maps. The rail levels-of-service shown are 
for freight trains only; the daily rail passenger service between 
Picton and Christchurch has been cancelled until the end of 
2017. The rail maps also show the level-of-service for the rail 
component of the rail-enabled Aratere Interislander ferry (the 
Aratere also carries vehicles and foot passengers, included in 
the vehicle and passenger ferry services: Figure 12 to Figure 
24).
 
Level-of-Service Mapping for State Highway Roads and Alternative Routes, Commercial Flights, and Bluebridge and Interislander 
Vehicle and Passenger Ferries 
 





Figure 13: Level-of-service at 16:00 on Day 1 (14th November 2016). 
 
Figure 14: Level-of-service on Day 2 (15th November 2016). 
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Figure 15: Level-of-service on Day 3 (16th November 2016). 
 
 





Figure 17: Level-of-service on Day 5 (18th November 2016). 
 




Figure 19: Level-of-service on Day 12 (25th November 2016). 
 





Figure 21: Level-of-service on Day 23 (6th December 2016). 
 
Figure 22: Level-of-service on Day 29 (12th December 2016). 
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Figure 23: Level-of-service on Day 38 (21st December 2016). 
 
Figure 24: Level-of-service on Day 100 (21st February 2017).
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Level-of-Service Mapping for Rail Lines Carrying Freight Goods Only, the Rail Component of the Aratere Rail-Enabled 
Interislander Ferry, and Official KiwiRail Diversions 
 
Figure 25: Rail level-of-service on Day 1 (14th November 2016). 
 
Figure 26: Rail level-of-service on Day 3 (16th November 2016). 
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Figure 27: Rail level-of-service on Day 16 (29th November 2016). 
 
 




Figure 29: Rail level-of-service on Day 64 (16th January 2016). 
 
 
Figure 30: Rail level-of-service on Day 100 (21st February 2017). 
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DISCUSSION 
National and Regional Response and Resilience 
From the national and regional economy perspective, the 
earthquake was severe due to the damage to distributed 
infrastructure, particularly transportation networks: 
immediately following the earthquake, SH1 was closed 
between Waipara and Wairau River township, SH7 (including 
SH7A) was closed between Waipara and Springs Junction, 
increasing the travel time between Christchurch and Picton 
from around 3½ hours to more than 8 hours (Figure 12), all 
rail services between Palmerston North (North Island, north of 
Wellington) and Christchurch were suspended (Figure 25), 
and Picton and Wellington ports were closed, closing the main 
sea link between the South and North islands. This caused 
regional impacts, particularly disrupting supply chains [11]. 
However, although there was still substantial strain on the 
transportation network, by the end of Day 1 access had greatly 
improved (Figure 13). SH1 had reopened from Waipara to 
Cheviot and SH7 had reopened between Waipara and Springs 
Junction (including daytime access along SH7A to Hanmer 
Springs), meaning the travel time between Christchurch and 
Picton became around 6½ hours. All ports were functioning 
(some at reduced capacity), and alternative cargo transport 
routes (by air, ferry, and road) remained. By Day 2, extra 
passenger flights were also being arranged where the usual 
transport capacity had been reduced below pre-earthquake 
levels, both between North Island and South Island locations, 
and between South Island locations (Figure 14). 
The event evidenced strong resilient characteristics of the New 
Zealand transport network, highlighting the value of resilient 
design, interdependency planning, mutual assistance 
agreements, and highly trained, adaptable and scalable human 
resources, encouraged by New Zealand’s strong lifelines 
culture. While the continued closure of critical sections of the 
country’s main highway, SH1, and in particular the loss of rail 
freight transport along the MNL railway line between Picton 
and Christchurch, have caused a major national issue in the 
aftermath of the earthquake, cross-network interdependencies 
and service provider adaptability have ensured continued 
transport of goods and people since Day 1. Air and sea 
transport increased capacity quickly, both for emergency 
response and to ensure routine transport of goods continued as 
rail services were substantially reduced. Road transport has 
been diverted, and although subsequently delayed, has 
remained operable under increased traffic flows due to the 
availability of alternative routes and rapid deployment of 
response measures, facilitating further usage increase from rail 
diversions. Although these alternative routes are under heavy 
pressure, these outcomes suggest the NIU’s focus on 
interdependency resilience and whole-of-system improved 
service, rather than asset, resilience is, at least to a degree, 
being achieved. 
However, whether the current level of regional resilience is 
acceptable, especially given the unreliability of air and sea 
travel, remains an important consideration. The rapid 
deployment of a number of response measures facilitated the 
SH7, SH65, SH6 and SH63 alternative route to provide 
sufficient redundancy, but the South Island remains vulnerable 
as the SH6 section of the alternative route is currently the only 
route connecting Canterbury, the West Coast, Southland and 
Otago to the North Island through Picton and Wellington, a 
problem highlighted by the relative ease by which other state 
highways have been closed by weather and fire events in 
recent months within the South Island alone. Additionally, the 
impact to KiwiRail caused by the closure of one rail line has 
been immense. The rail network is at present entirely 
dependent on shipping and road to operate. Without 
Government ownership and funding, including establishing 
NCTIR, the ongoing viability of the rail network would have 
been questionable; it is worth noting the resilience the 
government has added in this event. 
It is also worth noting that the negative impacts of this event 
have been reduced by circumstance. While the event caused 
no transport-related deaths or injuries, had this event occurred 
during daytime, this almost certainly would not have been the 
case. Additionally, in the 100 days after the event, the 
aftershock sequence caused relatively few transportation 
impacts, allowing for a swifter response and recovery 
operation. The event also uplifted the land relative to the sea 
by 1-2 m, itself increasing resilience to future coastal hazards, 
and reducing damage caused by the tsunami which followed 
the earthquake (further reduced because the event happened 
between mid and low tide) [38]. 
This event has highlighted the vulnerability of New Zealand’s 
regional transportation networks, which have limited or no 
redundancy in some cases. It is critical to address this issue in 
the area affected, and in other equally vulnerable regions. 
High-functioning alternative route redundancy, which can 
perform if another route or line is damaged (an area NZ 
Transport Agency had already identified as requiring 
improvement), is evidently needed [21, 39]. Using the road 
diversion as an example, while the longer route and increased 
volumes of traffic inevitably increased travel times, travel 
times along the alternative route could have been improved by 
pre-event measures including strengthening the pavement to 
cope with heavier truck loads, placing sufficient passing bays 
for high volumes of traffic, and building two-way traffic 
bridges at locations that could become bottlenecks under high 
traffic flows, instead of implementing these measures post-
earthquake. 
Local Response and Resilience 
The damage to land transport networks caused direct local 
impacts, including acute isolation of communities. However, 
the effective response to regional transport challenges allowed 
CDEM to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements. 
Road access to Kaikōura was first restored through Route 70, 
due to the heavier damage sustained by SH1. This local road, 
owned by Hurunui and Kaikōura district councils (Figure 1), 
was managed by Canterbury CDEM in conjunction with NZ 
Transport Agency under the declared State of Emergency, as 
an alternative to the damaged (and closed) state highway. 
Road management was a balancing act between three 
priorities: 1. repair of the road; 2. (emergency) supplies for 
and evacuation from Kaikōura; and 3. access for residents 
(including farmers). Effective management and operation was 
critical but challenging as prioritisation of any of the factors 
slowed down the other two, and the organisational 
arrangement had never previously been exercised. This led to 
some (short) operational delays and inconsistent public 
messaging.  NZ Transport Agency took full control of 
managing Route 70 on Day 16 (29th November 2016), and 
singularly managed the road until Day 38, when the 
Government announced NCTIR, which assumed responsibility 
for the rebuild of SH1, Route 70 and the MNL rail corridor. 
While all settlements had road access by Day 23, CDEM 
currently advises residents to be prepared with 7 days of 
emergency supplies. Although helicopter and (to some extent) 
sea access were sufficient during this event, the event also 
highlighted the unreliability of these modes of emergency 
transport. This evidence, along with scenarios being produced 
for other potential hazardous events, such as an Alpine Fault 
rupture scenario that suggests air response may be limited 
[40], mean the length of time without road access seen in 
Kaikōura could be a realistic example of the length of time 
people should be prepared to be isolated for. This highlights 
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the importance of preparedness, and the gap between 
recommendations and expected future events. 
CONCLUSION 
With increasing reliance on transport networks for vital 
services, such as just-in-time food and other fast-moving 
consumer goods delivery, the need for a resilient transport 
network has never been greater. From the national and 
regional economy perspective, the 14th November 2016 Mw 
7.8 earthquake was severe due to the damage to distributed 
infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks. 100 
days after the event, sections of New Zealand’s main highway, 
State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) 
railway line between Picton and Christchurch (Figure 1) 
remain closed, and is the major consequential issue still facing 
New Zealand. However, cross-network interdependencies and 
service provider adaptability have ensured continued regional 
transport of goods and people since Day 1, and this effective 
response to regional transport challenges allowed CDEM to 
quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements. 
This earthquake, alongside coincident events (such as severe 
weather and rural fires), highlighted the need for well-
practiced, efficient responses; major strengthening and 
engineering structures along critical transport routes; and high-
functioning alternative route redundancy, which can perform if 
another route or line is damaged. This work needs to be 
evidence-based and should take a holistic view of the essential 
nature of transportation infrastructure. Settlements were also 
without road access for 23 days, raising questions of the 
validity of current CDEM generic advice that residents 
nationally should be prepared with 7 days of emergency 
supplies. In rural and potentially isolated communities, 
advising preparation for a longer period appears necessary. 
Much of the groundwork for a resilient transport network was 
evidenced by this event, but it is important to learn from this, 
as well as from similar events experienced around the world. 
This earthquake has highlighted the vulnerability of New 
Zealand’s distributed infrastructure networks, which have little 
or no redundancy throughout the country. Ensuring the 
services provided by distributed infrastructure can remain 
functional after a natural hazard is a critical challenge in order 
to ensure the future viability of the country, which will face 
multiple known hazards, some of which will be of greater 
magnitude than this event, in the future. 
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APPENDIX: TIMELINE OF KEY TRANSPORT EVENTS 
Table key 
  Hazardous Event 
  Road 
 Rail 
 Air 
  Shipping 
 
Table 1. Kaikōura earthquake timeline: key transport events. 
Date Event 
Day 
Day Time Event Source 
DAY 1: Monday 14th November 2016 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 0:02 Mw7.8 earthquake. Canterbury CDEM 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 2:34 Wairau River Bridge to Waipara (SH1) closed. Marlborough CDEM, 
NZ Transport Agency 
14/11/2016 1 Mon   Waipara to Springs Junction (SH7) closed. NZ Transport Agency 
14/11/2016 1 Mon   Culverden to Kaikōura (Route 70) closed under Civil 
Defence Emergency Management act. 
Canterbury CDEM, 
NZ Transport Agency 
14/11/2016 1 Mon   The Main North Line between Picton and Christchurch is 
closed. 
KiwiRail 
14/11/2016 1 Mon  All ferry sailings cancelled until Wellington and Picton 
ferry terminals are inspected and cleared to re-open. 
KiwiRail 
14/11/2016 1 Mon   The rail-enabled Aratere Interislander ferry not shipping, 
pending clearance of the Wellington rail span. 
KiwiRail 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 6:00 Picton to Blenheim (SH1) only open for Class 1 vehicles, 
up to 50kg. Heavier vehicles backed up for several 
kilometres along the highway. 
Marlborough CDEM 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 10:15 Diversion around Wairau River Bridge in place on SH1, 
via SH62 and SH6. 
NZ Transport Agency 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 13:00 Lyttleton and timaru ports reopen. Canterbury CDEM 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 14:00 Engineers on site at Wairau River Bridge, which remains 
closed. 
Marlborough CDEM 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 15:22 Waipara to Cheviot (SH1) open. NZ Transport Agency 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 15:25 Blenheim to Seddon (SH1) open. NZ Transport Agency 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 15:30 SH7A open to light vehicles, will close again at 8pm. NZ Transport Agency 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 15:59 Waipara to Springs Junction (SH7) open. NZ Transport Agency 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 16:00 Kaikōura airfield functional and operating. Priority is to 
get tourists out of Kaikōura. 
Canterbury CDEM 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 17:00 Supplies have started arriving in Kaikōura by helicopter. Canterbury CDEM 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 20:00 SH7A closed for repairs. NZ Transport Agency 
14/11/2016 1 Mon 20:00 The Wairau River Bridge is expected to reopen this 
evening. Emergency vehicles only are cleared on SH1 
south of Seddon. Fuel is being supplied to Seddon 
residents. 
Marlborough CDEM 
14/11/2016 1 Mon   Wellington Port ferries operating, many cargo ships are 
diverting to ports including Napier, Tauranga and 
Auckland. 
CentrePort 
DAY 2: Tuesday 15th November 2016 
15/11/2016 2 Tue 6:00 Work begins to clear SH1 to Kaikōura from the south. Canterbury CDEM 
15/11/2016 2 Tue 7:54 SH7A open to light vehicles. No towing. There is a 
stop/go sign at the Waiau River bridge. 
NZ Transport Agency 
15/11/2016 2 Tue 8:30 SH6 is closed from north of Rai Valley township to 7 km 
south of Havelock: Rai Valley township has been isolated 
by flooding on one side and a slip on the other. SH63 
remains open but has surface flooding. 
Marlborough CDEM 
15/11/2016 2 Tue 9:45 Route 70 being investigated as alternate route to access 
Kaikōura. 
Canterbury CDEM 
15/11/2016 2 Tue   Air New Zealand is operating scheduled flights from 
Marlborough. 
Marlborough CDEM 
15/11/2016 2 Tue   Air New Zealand is operating an additional return service 









15/11/2016 2 Tue   Pelorus Air are providing a charter service between 
Marlborough and Kaikōura. 
Marlborough CDEM 
15/11/2016 2 Tue   Two out of three Interislander ferries (the Kaiarahi and 
Kaitaki) begin carrying freight and vehicle passengers 
only. Foot traffic passengers are suspended due to 
terminal damage. 
KiwiRail 
15/11/2016 2 Tue   KiwiRail has set up coordination centres in Christchurch 
and Wellington to enable a closer working relationship 
with NZ Transport Agency as work continues to assess 
the damage to the Main North Line and SH1. 
KiwiRail 
15/11/2016 2 Tue 16:45 Rai Valley to Renwick (SH6) open. NZ Transport Agency 
15/11/2016 2 Tue 23:59 198 people evacuated from Kaikōura via NZDF 
helicopters. 
Canterbury CDEM 
"First few days" 
Army convoys travel through to Kaikōura. Critical 
infrastructure vehicles allowed through later. 
Canterbury CDEM 
DAY 3: Wednesday 16th November 2016 
16/11/2016 3 Wed 6:00 HMNZS Wellington and Canterbury arrive at Kaikōura. Canterbury CDEM 
16/11/2016 3 Wed 10:48 SH7A Open (no restrictions), will close at 8pm for 
repairs. Expected to be reopened by 7am. 
NZ Transport Agency 
16/11/2016 3 Wed   Culverden to Waiau (Route 70) reopens. NZ Transport Agency 
16/11/2016 3 Wed   Mangamaunu to Peketa (SH1, via Kaikōura) reopens. NZ Transport Agency 
16/11/2016 3 Wed   Picton to Ward (SH1) open. NZ Transport Agency 
16/11/2016 3 Wed   Photo ID required to travel South of Seddon on SH1 
while the emergency operation is underway. 
Marlborough CDEM 
16/11/2016 3 Wed   Intercity Coach resumes Nelson to Picton service, begins 
Christchurch to Picton service via SH7, SH65, SH6 and 
SH63. 
Marlborough CDEM 
16/11/2016 3 Wed   All freight lines in the North Island and south of 
Christchurch are open and operating. 
KiwiRail 
16/11/2016 3 Wed   Freight is being delivered to the container transfer site at 
Blenheim and then by truck to Christchurch, either via 
SH63, SH6, SH65 and SH7 or the West Coast region. 
KiwiRail 
16/11/2016 3 Wed   Burnham Whard (Wellington) reopened for shipping 
services. 
CentrePort 
16/11/2016 3 Wed 12:00 Leader Road closed NZ Transport Agency 
16/11/2016 3 Wed 14:30 HMNZS Canterbury loading ~380 people for evacuation 
to Christchurch. 
Canterbury CDEM 




16/11/2016 3 Wed 23:09 SH63, SH6, SH65 and SH7 is recommended SH1 detour. NZ Transport Agency 
16/11/2016 3 Wed 23:59 165 people evacuated from Kaikōura via NZDF 
helicopters. 
Canterbury CDEM 
DAY 4: Thursday 17th November 2016 
17/11/2016 4 Thurs   SH7A Open NZ Transport Agency 
17/11/2016 4 Thurs 1:00 HMNZS Canterbury arrived at Lyttleton. Evacuated 449 
people from Kaikōura. 
Canterbury CDEM 
17/11/2016 4 Thurs 8:00 Temporary Restricted Area established around Kaikōura 
to facilitate safe aircraft operations. Expires 22/11/16 
17:00. 
Canterbury CDEM 
17/11/2016 4 Thurs 10:16 Controlled access for residents and emergency services 
between Cheviot and Goose Bay (SH1) 
NZ Transport Agency 
17/11/2016 4 Thurs 12:10 SH1 now open fully between Picton and just south of 
Ward. Speed restrictions and many one lane sections 
along route. A checkpoint is installed at the end of this 
stretch, where the road remains closed. 
Marlborough CDEM, 
NZ Transport Agency 
17/11/2016 4 Thurs 16:30 Bluebridge resume foot passenger travel, Interislander 
cannot take foot passengers from Picton to Wellington, 
but can take foot passengers from Wellington to Picton. 
Marlborough CDEM 
DAY 5: Friday 18th November 2016 
18/11/2016 5 Fri   HMNZS Te Kaha, HMNZS Endeavour, USS Sampson, 
HMAS Darwin and HMCS Vancouver call at Wellington 
harbour, before leaving for Kaikōura. 
CentrePort 
18/11/2016 5 Fri 6:00 HMNZS Canterbury and international fleet arrives at 




18/11/2016 5 Fri   Wellington Port reopens for cruise ships following 
inspections. 
CentrePort 
18/11/2016 5 Fri   Freight demand on New Zealand's busiest domestic sea 
route, Auckland to Christchurch, has doubled following 
the massive Kaikōura Earthquake on Monday. 
KiwiRail 
18/11/16 5 Fri  Two out of three Interislander ferries (the Kaiarahi and 
Kaitaki) begin carrying foot traffic passengers from 
Picton to Wellington. 
KiwiRail 
DAY 6: Saturday 19th November 2016 
19/11/2016 6 Sat 18:00 HMNZS Canterbury departs Kaikōura for Lyttleton. 
Remainder of fleet depart for Wellington. 
Canterbury CDEM 
DAY 7: Sunday 20th November 2016 
20/11/2016 7 Sun 18:00 HMNZS Canterbury arrived at Lyttonton. Evacuated 186 
people. 
Canterbury CDEM 
WEEK 2: Monday 21st to Sunday 27th November 2016 
21/11/2016 8 Mon 18:00 HMNZS Canterbury stood down. Canterbury CDEM 
20/11/2016 8 Mon 18:00 SoundsAir launches temporary services, flying daily 
between Kaikōura and Christchurch and Blenheim (10-
person flights). On the first flights SoundsAir deliver two 
tonnes of mail for New Zealand Post (Christchurch to 




22/11/2016 9 Tue   A limited container service begins from Wellington Port 
following implementation of on-ship cranes and mobile 
cranes on the wharf. The port's container cranes are 
currently non-operational and there is liquefaction and 
substantial differentiated settlement across the container 
operations area. 
CentrePort 
22/11/2016 9 Tue 18:13 M5.7 earthquake near Scargill. Canterbury CDEM 
25/11/2016 12 Fri 15:00 First Route 70 convoy of 81 vehicles from Kaikōura to 
Waiau (planned). 
Canterbury CDEM 
25/11/2016 12 Fri   Wellington Port receives HMNZS Otago to resupply 
following earthquake recovery work in Kaikōura. 
CentrePort 
26/11/2016 13 Sat   Stock trucks pass through Route 70 on animal welfare 
grounds. Does some damage to the road. 
Canterbury CDEM 
WEEKS 3+: Monday 28th November to Friday 9th December 2016 
28/11/2016 15 Mon   KiwiRail enters the Coastal Shipping market with a new 
NZ Connect service, from Auckland's Wiri Inland Port 
and KiwiRail's Southdown Freight Hub to Lyttleton's 
Midland Port or KiwiRail's Christchurch terminal via 
ANL shipping services, in a partnership between 
KiwiRail, Ports of Auckland, Lyttleton Port and ANL 
Shipping. 
KiwiRail 
28/11/2016 15 Mon 19:00 Civil Aviation Authority restricted airspace over 
Kaikōura expires. 
Canterbury CDEM 
29/11/2016 16 Tue   KiwiRail's rail-enabled Interislander ferry, Aratere, 
resumes sailing for freight customers and foot passengers 
after the link span at Wellington's ferry terminal, used to 
load and discharge vehicles, was repaired. Rail link-span 
still under repair so no rail wagons able to be loaded into 
Aratere. 
KiwiRail 
29/11/2016 16 Tue 7:00 NZ Transport Agency now managing and operating 
Route 70. Process in place from managing public access 
to Route 70. 
Canterbury CDEM 
4/12/2016 21 Sun 12:00 M5.5 earthquake near Seddon. Canterbury CDEM 
6/12/2016 22 Mon  SoundsAir adds additional flights between Christchurch 
and Blenheim for the Christmas and New Year period. 
Press 
6/12/2016 23 Tue   The Wellington rail link-span is repaired, allowing rail 
wagons to be loaded on to the rail-enabled Aratere 
Interislander ferry, and so resume full service. 
KiwiRail 
6/12/2016 23 Tue   Waiau to Kaikōura controlled access (Route 70). NZ Transport Agency 
6/12/2016 23 Tue   Controlled access for residents and emergency services 
from Ward to Clarence (SH1). 
NZ Transport Agency 
12/12/2016 29 Mon 18:00 Picton to Clarence (SH1) reopens. NZ Transport Agency 
17/12/2016 34 Sat 16:00 NZ TRANSPORT AGENCY advises delays along 
advised SH1 detour (SH63, SH6, SH65, SH7) due to 
multiple roadwork sites. 
NZ Transport Agency 
21/12/2016 38 Wed   Waiau to Kaikōura open (Route 70). NZ Transport Agency 
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21/12/2016 38 Wed 14:26 Cheviot to Goose Bay (SH1) open. NZ Transport Agency 
21/12/2016 38 Wed 14:26 Goose Bay to Peketa (SH1, via Kaikōura) open 6am - 
8pm (SH1). 
NZ Transport Agency 
21/12/2016 38 Wed   Government announces the North Canterbury Transport 
Infrastructure Rebuild (NCTIR) alliance, between NZ 
Transport Agency, KiwiRail, Fulton Hogan, Downer, 
Higgins and HEB Construction, led by Duncan Gibb, 
former lead of the Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure 
Rebuild Team (SCIRT). NCTIR is responsible for 
managing and operating, as well as all recovery, rebuild 
and resilience works, on SH1 and Route 70. 
Government 
21/12/2016 38 Wed  Crane arrives to remove containers off train trapped 
outside Kaikōura, to be delivered by road. 
Press 
22/12/2016 39 Thurs  Christchurch to Picton route (SH7, SH65, SH6, SH63) 
speed limit reduced from 100 km/h to 80 km/h. Wairau 
River township speed limit reduced to 60 km/h. 
Press 
29/12/2016 46 Thurs 7:52 Hundalee to Kaikōura (SH1) closed due to weather 
conditions causing an increased risk of rockfall. 
NZ Transport Agency 
29/12/2016 46 Thurs 9:20 Hundalee to Kaikōura (SH1) reopened (6am - 8pm). NZ Transport Agency 
4/01/2017 52 Wed 14:20 Peketa to Goose Bay (SH1) closed due to weather 
conditions causing an increased risk of rockfall. 
NZ Transport Agency 
4/01/2017 52 Wed 17:00 Peketa to Goose Bay (SH1) reopened (6am - 8pm). NZ Transport Agency 
9/01/2017 57 Mon 5:35 Peketa to Hunalee (SH1) closed due to a slip. NZ Transport Agency 
9/01/2017 57 Mon 6:00 Stop/go required in various locations along SH7 for road 
pavement repairs. Expected to last until 20/1/17. 
NZ Transport Agency 
11/01/2017 59 Wed 9:52 Peketa to Hunalee (SH1) reopened (6am - 8pm). NZ Transport Agency 
16/01/2017 64 Mon   The first freight train to leave the Blenheim Freight Hub 
heading south successfully completes its journey to Lake 
Grassmere, opening the way for commercial goods to run 
again on this section of the South Island's Main North 
Line. 
KiwiRail 
 
